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CASE COMMENTS

THE PUBLIC PURPOSE TAX EXEMPTION IN FLORIDA:
OLD WINE IN A NEW BOTTLE
Dade County v. PanAmerican World Airways, Inc., 275 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1973)
Appellant, acting as Dade County Port Authority, assessed an ad valorem
tax for 1970 on appellee's leasehold interests in county-owned land and improvements at Miami International Airport.' Appellee challenged the legality
of the assessment. The trial court declared the tax on appellee's leasehold
interests invalid and enjoined its collection. On direct appeal 2 the Florida
supreme court affirmed and HELD, leasehold interests in publicly owned airport property used for purposes related to public air transportation satisfy
the requirements of a public purpose3 and are exempt from ad valorem taxa4
tion.
A public purpose has been defined as an activity having for its objective
the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, welfare, security, prosperity,
and contentment of all the inhabitants within a given political district.5 The
history of the public purpose 6 exemption from taxation in Florida has been a

chronicle of uneven expansion. Judicial construction of the exemption has
resulted in a perplexing array of contradictions and ambiguities. 8 For example,
profits from a municipally owned and operated utilities system have been
denied tax exemption 9 while ad valorem assessment on the physical plant of
a municipally owned and operated utilities system has been invalidatedlo

Moreover, public purpose exemptions have included improvements on a pub-

1. Appellee's leasehold interests at Miami International Airport were in land and improvements owned by Dade County but controlled, maintained, and operated by the Dade
County Port Authority. 275 So. 2d 505, 507 (Fla. 1973).
2. Pursuant to the jurisdictional provisions of FLA. CONST. art. V, §4(2).
3. FLA. CONsT. art. XVI, §16 (1885); FLA. CONST. art. VII, §3(a). All of appellee's assessed leaseholds except one had been acquired prior to the effective date of the 1968 constitution (Jan. 7, 1969). Since the provisions of the 1968 constitution are prospective in application, FLA. CoNs'r. art. XII, §7(a)-(b), the tax exemption issues raised by the pre-1968
leaseholds were governed by the exemption provisions of the 1885 constitution. The status
of the remaining leasehold, acquired after the effective date of the 1968 constitution, was
governed by art. VII, §(a). Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 266, §, at 498-99 (repealed 1969), reenacted
as Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 55, §§1-2, at 240-57 (repealed 1971) (presently consolidated with
other tax provisions in FLA. STAT. §196.199 (1971).
4. 275 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1973) (Ervin, J., dissenting).
5. Lott v. City of Orlando, 142 Fla. 338, 343, 196 So. 313, 315 (1940).
6. The court has construed "public purpose," "municipal purpose," and "public function" to be synonymous, "public purpose" being the inclusive categorization. Daytona Beach
Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist. v. Paul, 179 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1965); Gwin v. City of
Tallahassee, 132 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1961).
7. See generally Note, The "Public Purpose" and "Charitable" Tax Exemptions in
Florida:A Judicial Morass, 19 U. FLA. L. Ray. 330 (1966).
8. Id.
9. City of Lakeland v. Amos, 106 Fla. 873, 143 So. 744 (1932).
10. Gwin v. City of Tallahassee, 132 So. 2d 273 (Fla, 1961),
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licly owned football stadium,"1 but excluded construction of a publicly owned
baseball complex.l2
The confusion generated by these and similar decisions reflected a judicial
vacillation between strict presumptions against tax exemptions 3 and deference
to the broad exemption formulations of the legislature.14 The supreme court's
synthesis of these two conflicting exemption standards was the "incidental
profit" test.'5 Satisfaction of this test required an exemption claimant to show
that the use of his property had for its objective a predominant public purpose. 16 The effect of the test was to liberalize the "used exclusively for . ..
municipal ...

purposes"'

7

requirement of the tax exemption provision of the

s

1885 constitution.- The broad scope of the "incidental profit" criterion has
embraced such diverse public purposes as construction of an office building for
lease,' 9 low income housing, 20 recreation area concessions, 21 a gasoline station
in a public parking lot,2 - and a cultural center.2 3
The public purpose exemption was further complicated by the supreme
court's dicta in Park-N-Shop v. Sparkman,24 where the court concluded that for
taxation purposes a leasehold was a distinct interest in property separate from
the lessor's interest. The court also said a leasehold neither fell within the
statutory definition of tangible personal property 25 nor intangible personal

11. State v. City of Miami, 41 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1949). The state challenged the validation
of revenue bonds issued to finance improvements on the Orange Bowl, maintaining the
bond issue was not for a public purpose. Much of the case law defining a public purpose
has been written in revenue bond validation litigation.
12. Brandes v. City of Deerfield Beach, 186 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1966). Taxpayer challenged
validation of revenue bonds issued to finance construction of a baseball complex to be
leased to private parties.
13. See, e.g., Lummus v. Cushman, 41 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1949); Wolfson v. Heins, 149 Fla.
499, 6 So. 2d 858 (1942); State ex rel. Miller v. Doss, 146 Fla. 752, 2 So. 2d 303 (1941).
14. "What constituted a municipal purpose is a legislative question that should not be
interfered with by the courts in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion." State ex rel.
Harper v. McDavid, 145 Fla. 605, 608, 200 So. 100, 102 (1941).
15. Note, supra note 7, at 339.
16. See, e.g., State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist., 89 So. 2d 34
(Fla. 1956); State v. Board of Control, 66 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1953); Lummus v. Florida Adirondack School, Inc., 123 Fla. 810, 168 So. 232 (1936).
17. FLA. CONST. art. XVI, §16 (1885).
18. Note, supra note 7, at 339.
19. State v. City of Tallahassee, 142 Fla. 476, 195 So. 402 (1940).
20. Marvin v. Housing Authority, 133 Fla. 590, 183 So. 145 (1938).
21. Panama City v. State, 93 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1957).
22. Gate City Garage v. City of Jacksonville, 66 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1953).
23. State v. Inter-American Center Authority, 84 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1955).
24. 99 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 1957). A private corporation challenged a tax exemption granted
county-owned property located within a municipality. The property was leased to private
individuals operating totally for private commercial purposes. The court held the county's
ownership interest immune from taxation.
25. Fla. Laws 1941, ch. 20,723, §1, at 1968 (repealed 1965, presently FLA. STAT.
§192.001(1 1)(d) (1971)).
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property 26 and therefore was not subject to taxation, since taxes may be levied
only in accordance with statutory authority. 27 Nevertheless, it stated a private
leasehold in public property could be made a taxable interest in real property
28
should the legislature choose to do So.
Statutes enacted in response to the Park-N-Shop dicta made a private leasehold in public property a taxable interest in real property. 29 Unfortunately,
these statutes contained the exemption terminology of the 1885 constitution. 3°
Given the substantial body of case law interpreting "exclusive use" and
"municipal purpose," the legislative choice of words consigned taxable leaseholds to the general confusion of public purpose exemptions. 31
Notwithstanding Park-N-Shop and the leasehold taxing statute, the high
water mark of the public purpose exemption of ownership interests in real
property was reached in 1965 in Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities District v. Paul.32 There, the court found the tourist attraction and

recreational aspects of a speedway sufficient justification to exempt the district
from the taxing power of the county, even though the speedway was operated

for profit by private lessees. 33 Thus, the lease by the public owner to private
individuals operating for profit was an "exclusive use" for municipal purposes.

Three years after Daytona Beach Racing, however, the court's holding in
Hillsborough County Aviation Authority v. Waldens- seemed to presage a
marked departure from liberal judicial interpretation of the public purpose
exemption. The county had levied ad valorem assessments on the Authority's
ownership interest in numerous airport properties leased to private individuals.
The county had also assessed a private leasehold in airport property owned by

26. Fla. Laws 1941, ch. 20,724, §§2, 4, at 1985-87 (repealed 1965, presently FLA. STAT.
§199.023(1) (1971)).
27. FLA. CONST. art. IX, §8 (1885). "No tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law."
(presently FLA. CONSr. art. VII, §1 (a)).
28. 99 So. 2d at 574.
29. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 266, §, at 498-99 (repealed 1969), reenacted as Fla. Laws 1969,
ch. 55, §§1-2, at 240-57 (repealed 1971). "(1) Any real or personal property which for any
reason is exempt or immune from taxation but is being used, occupied, owned, controlled or
possessed, directly or indirectly by a person, firm, corporation, partnership or other organization in connection with a profit making venture, whether such use, occupation, ownership,
control or possession is by lease, loan, contract of sale, option to purchase or in any wise
made available to or used by such person, firm, corporation, partnership or organization,
shall be assessed and taxed to the same extent and in the same manner as other real or
personal property." (Superseded by FLA. STAT. §196.199 (1971)).
30. Id. "(2) This section shall not apply to property described in subsection (1) when:
(c) The property is owned or used by the state, any county, municipality, or public entity
or authority created by statute and is leased or otherwise made available to such person,
firm, corporation, partnership or organization by such public body for a consideration in the
performance by the public body of a public function or public purpose authorized by law,
or which property prior to the effective date of this act was leased for valuable consideration
for purposes not otherwise exempt ...
31. Note, supra note 7.
32. 179 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1965).
33. Id. at 354.
34. 210 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1968).
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the county itself. The court held the Authority had forfeited its statutory grant
of exemption35 from county taxing power because of the predominantly private
uses by the Authority's lessees. 36 It also validated the ad valorem assessment on
the leasehold in the county's immune property,3 7 since such property was used
for private purposes. 83 By denying public owner exemptions similar to those
granted in Daytona Beach Racing, and validating an ad valorem tax on a
private leasehold in public property, the decision opened potentially valuable
sources of local tax revenue. 39
The coincidence of Hillsborough County Aviation and the ratification of
the 1968 constitution40 left the public purpose exemption in limbo. 41 The
Florida supreme court's departure from traditional public purpose liberalism
in Hillsborough County Aviation compounded the uncertainty incident to the
eventual construction of the tax exemption provision of the 1968 constitution,
article VII, section 3(a), which provides in part: "All property owned by a
municipality and used exclusively by it for municipal or public purposes shall
be exempt from taxation." 42 This provision narrows the constitutional grant of
public purpose exemptions because it requires public ownership of the exempt
property, whereas the 1885 constitution was silent on owner identity.4 3 Given
this public ownership requirement, two questions remained prior to the instant
case: (1) whether "owned by a municipality and used exclusively by it" precluded leasehold exemptions; and (2) whether the exclusive use requirement
of the public purpose exemption would be reinterpreted by the court in view
44
of the new constitutional exemption language.
The instant court's answer to the first question was a resounding negative. 45
After a pro forma statement that article VII, section 3(a) was an entirely new
treatment of municipal tax exemptions,46 the court used existing case law

35. Fla. Laws 1945, ch. 23,339, §20, at 492-95.
36. 210 So. 2d at 196.
37. "Exemption presupposes the existence of a power to tax whereas immunity connotes
the absence of that power. The state and its political subdivisions, like a county, are immune from taxation since there is no power to tax them .... A municipality can be taxed
but may be exempt if it meets the statutory criteria for exemption." Orlando Util. Comm'n
v. Milligan, 229 So. 2d 262, 264 (Fla. 1969).
38. 210 So. 2d at 196.
39. Note, supra note 7, at 340.
40. The 1968 constitution was ratified on Nov. 5, 1968. Note, Property Tax Exemptions
Under Article VII, Section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution of 1968, 21 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 641,
643 (1969).
41. Id. at 655.
42. The use of the word "municipality" as related to determinations of public purposes
and tax exemptions has been construed to encompass counties, corporate municipalities,
agencies, authorities, and other public bodies. See Holbein v. Hall, 189 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1966).
43. FLA. CONsT. art. XVI, §16 (1885). "The property of all corporations . . . shall be

subject to taxation unless such property be held and used exclusively for religious, scientific,
municipal, educational, literary or charitable purposes." (Emphasis added.)
44. Compare FLA.

CONST. art.

VII, §3(a), with FLA. CONST. art. XVI, §16 (1885).

45. 275 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1973).
46. Id.at5ll.
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interpreting the exemption provision of the 1885 constitution 47 to interpret
the exemption provision of the 1968 constitution. 48 In so doing, it failed to
draw a distinction with respect to the identity of exemption claimants between the language "property owned by a municipality and used exclusively
by it for municipal or public purposes" in the 1968 provision49 and the language "property of all corporations .. .held and used exclusively for . . .
municipal ... purposes" in the 1885 provision. 50 Likewise ignoring the "used
exclusively by it" requirement for a public purpose exemption in article VII,
section 3(a),51 the instant court assumed that the tax exemption provision of
the 1968 constitution52 included private leaseholds in public property without
addressing the issue directly.53 Thus, the only conclusion that logically can be
drawn is that lease of property by the public owner to a private individual
qualifies as an exclusive use by the public owner under the tax exemption provision of the 1968 constitution.54 As a result both the ownership interest and
the leasehold interest are exempt from taxation where the use is for a public
purpose. 55
Having resolved the leasehold issue by default, the instant court expounded at length on the exclusive use requirement in relation to the nature
of a public purpose and concluded that exclusive use subsumes incidental
benefit to the exemption claimant where a public purpose is predominant.5 6
The substance of its rationale was that "used exclusively" modifies "for municipal or public purposes" 57 and, since a public purpose may include incidental private profit, the exclusive use requirement does not adversely affect
tax exemption where private profit is subordinated to a predominant public
purpose. 8
The principal case perpetuates both ownership and leasehold exemptions
as well as the "incidental profit" test. Given the growing disparity between

47. FLA. CoNsr. art. XVI, §16 (1885).
48. FLA. CONsT. art. VII, §3(a).

49. Id.
50. FLA. CONsr. art. XVI, §16 (1885).
51. FLA. CONsr. art. VII, §3(a). It is inconceivable that the language "used exclusively
by it" could refer to exclusive use by anyone other than the municipal owner.
52. Id.

53. 275 So. 2d at 512.
54. FLA. CoNsr. art. VII, §3(a).

55. Approximately half of appellee's leasehold interests were in airport property
acquired and improved by the issuance of revenue bonds. The court would have decided
differently in relation to the exemption of these leaseholds had it not been for the prospective application of FLA. CoNsT. art. VII, §10, which forbids exemption of leaseholds in air-

port property or public port facilities acquired or improved by revenue bond financing.
Nevertheless, all of appellee's leaseholds in revenue bond property were acquired prior to
the effective date of the 1968 constitution and are therefore exempted by FLA. CONsT. art.

XVI, §16 (1885). This distinction does not affect the court's construction of FLA. CONSr. art.
VII, §3(a) as it relates to non-revenue bond property exemptions.
56. 275 So. 2d at 512.
57. FLA. CONsr. art. VII, §3(a).
58. 275 So. 2d at 512.
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increasing demand for governmental services at the local level and the scarcity
of available funding, it is imperative that the public purpose tax exemption
be reexamined by the legislature. Tax exemptions have been granted by
statute in order to stimulate the performance of various public tasks. 59 The
need for such incentive, however, recedes as the particular mode of performing
a given public purpose becomes established and increasingly profitable.60 Unfortunately, the exemption remains long after the initial need for economic
stimulation has vanished.
The utility of specific tax exemptions must be reevaluated in the context
of Florida's requirements today, not the requirements of yesterday. The supreme court itself has said: "The answer to what is a municipal purpose is
not static. Each generation may determine its concept of these things." 61 The
expansion of the public purpose exemption has been piecemeal. The scope
of the exemption may be reduced in the same manner. In view of the court's
reluctance to depart from established definitions of a public purpose, 62 the
legislature should act to limit the present scope of tax exemptions.
JOHN

M.

STIPANOVICH

59. E.g., Fla. Laws 1955, ch. 31,343, §13, at 3687; Fla. Laws 1955, ch. 29,830, §4, at 610;
Fla. Laws 1945, ch. 24,579, §5, at 1437.
60. While any decision to repeal a tax exemption is necessarily the province of the

legislature, it is unlikely that repeal of tax exemptions would cause an established, paying
enterprise to fail, thus depriving the public of the benefits that originally justified the ex-

emption.
61. State v. City of Tallahassee, 142 Fla. 476, 479, 195 So. 402, 403 (1940).
62. "Like the Almighty in all things, the legislature in certain mundane things 'giveth
and taketh away.' Unless and until the legislature repeals the tax exemption, we hold it
must stand." Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist. v. Paul, 179 So. 2d 349,
355 (Fla. 1965).
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